System and method for facilitating data leakage and/or propagation tracking

ABSTRACT

In some embodiments, a set of hashes that are associated with files of a user system, and a reference set of hashes that are associated with files of a reference system, may be obtained. An additional subset of hashes (included in the set of hashes and not included in the reference set of hashes) may be obtained based on a comparison between the set of hashes and the reference set of hashes. A file may be predicted to be exclusive for certain users or user systems, where the file is associated with a hash included in the additional subset of hashes. Other user systems may be scanned to determine what files are on the other user systems, where each of the other user systems is assigned to another user or is not one of the user systems. An alert indicating unauthorized activity may be generated based on the scan.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/179,933, filed Jun. 10, 2016, which is a continuation of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/403,108, filed Feb. 23, 2012, each of which isincorporated herein in its entirety by reference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention generally relates to a system and method for facilitatingdata leakage and/or propagation tracking.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

An important trend in securing an information technology infrastructurerelates to preventing theft, disclosure, leakage, or other unauthorizedpropagation associated with sensitive data and information. For example,underground markets have already shown an ability to monetize data anddocuments improperly leaked or propagated in a manner that violatesorganizational policy or contravenes organizational boundaries, whichhas led to governments pursuing efforts to impose fines and otherpenalties on organizations that leak sensitive data. Consequently, anorganization that inadvertently allows unauthorized access to sensitivedata may be penalized on multiple fronts because fines may be imposed topenalize the data leakage, and moreover, the organization must furtherdeal with risks that the leaked data may be improperly used to attack orotherwise compromise the organization. The problems associated with dataleakage and document propagation can be expected to increasesubstantially in the near future because many (or most) lawmakers,regulators, security managers, and other “powers that be” have yet torealize the pace and extent to which sensitive data has become exposedand distributed.

For example, many emerging information technology services usecloud-based technologies to enable users to share files with others andtransfer work between different computing environments, which canprovide users with various benefits (e.g., overcoming restrictions onthe size associated with files that be attached to individual emails,addressing problems that arise when an inbox grows too large becausemany emails have large file attachments, expanding access to filesbeyond internal file sharing services that otherwise limit access tousers that are connected locally or via virtual private networks, andmaking files available in different computing environments despite thefact that many information technology departments do not offer easy waysto share files via public FTP servers and other traditional methods dueto security concerns). Despite the potential benefits that cloud-basedservices may offer, security and usage associated therewith oftenviolates corporate policies and security best practices. As such,organizations must assess how cloud-based technologies align with theirsecurity policies and compliance mandates and monitor usage associatedwith these technologies to ensure compliance and limit data exposurewithout undermining the benefits that these technologies offer. However,existing network security systems tend to have limitations in theirability to detect whether software to interact with cloud-based serviceshas been installed on client computers (e.g., because the clientsoftware may not be actively uploading or downloading data when theclient computers are scanned). Furthermore, existing network securitysystems typically cannot properly implement monitoring, encryption, andother security measures at a level that can appropriately detect andprotect sensitive data from being insecurely transmitted to acloud-based service. For example, many cloud-based services communicatedata over trusted SSL sessions, but recent trends in the networksecurity community have discovered several recent attacks that havecircumvented SSL security and compromised SSL certificate authorities,whereby data transmitted to or from cloud-based service may besusceptible to improper leakage even if SSL has been properlyimplemented.

Moreover, the problems that relate to data leaking and documentspropagating in a manner that violates policy are not unique tocloud-based services or other threats that may be external to a managedinformation technology infrastructure. Indeed, many data leakage anddocument propagation problems arise because authorized employeesimproperly engage in certain restricted activities, outsiders infiltratethe infrastructure to perform apparently authorized activities, orinformation technology resources have exploitable vulnerabilities, amongother things. For example, many employees like to access their musiccollections at the workplace, which may raise liabilities such aspotential fines or penalties due to users improperly sharing copyrightedcontent on the network or network degradation because file sharingactivity occupies available bandwidth to download content. In anotherexample, many organizations may have sensitive corporate and customerdata inadvertently or maliciously disclosed because the sensitive datawas “too available” to employees that did not actually require access.However, existing network security systems typically cannot establish acomprehensive inventory to identify particular servers, computers, orother resources that typically host sensitive corporate and customerdocuments, nor can existing network security systems detect whethernetwork traffic may include sensitive corporate and customer documentsin transit, which interferes with the ability to know where sensitivecontent may be hosted and thereby prevent, detect, and remediate dataleakage and document propagation incidents. In particular, almost everyresource within a particular network will typically generate variousevents to describe activity associated with the device, yet correlatingevents that relate to many devices distributed across a network tends tobe very difficult because the events may have different formats,describe different activities, repeat certain events multiple times, orhave large volumes that can be difficult to analyze in a useful manner.Furthermore, managing changes and access controls presents importantchallenges because certain activity patterns may reflect securitybreaches, compliance issues, or other risks that sensitive data anddocuments are being leaked or improperly propagated.

Accordingly, network security practitioners and managers arecontinuously presented with the difficult task to balance tradeoffsbetween controlling certain risky activities that can be performed on anetwork without restricting those potentially risky activities to theextent that potentially valuable business opportunities may bedisrupted. In the network security context, probabilities are rarelysimple, which tends to require network security practitioners toestimate the likelihood that vulnerabilities may be exploited againstestimated business benefits that those vulnerabilities may offer. Inother words, properly managing a network involves a delicate balancebetween ensuring that users have the freedom to perform activities thatwill benefit business while employing measures that can properlyprevent, detect, and mitigate the risks that may arise if data ordocuments leak or otherwise propagate across organizational boundariesin a manner that violates policy. However, existing network securitysystems tend to fall short in managing these problems due to thecomplexity involved in suitably classifying all the resources that arehosted on or interact with an information technology infrastructure,identifying where certain files are located in the infrastructure, anddetecting atypical deviations that relate to certain files appearing insuspicious places or moving from one location to another.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

According to one aspect of the invention, the system and methoddescribed herein may generally use file hashes to track data leakage anddocument propagation in a network. In particular, the system and methoddescribed herein may generally have a management console create varioustables or manifests that list file hashes, file names, and pathsassociated with every file on one or more known reference systems. Forexample, in one implementation, the management console may generatecryptographic hashes, checksums, or other signatures to uniquelyidentify the files on the known reference systems based on contents,attributes, or other properties associated therewith. In oneimplementation, the tables or manifests that list the file hashes, filenames, and paths associated with the files on the known referencesystems may therefore describe one or more directories or folders andassociated contents that provide “ideal” or master sets to baselinesubsequent comparisons performed with various matching and analyticalalgorithms that the management console may run to track data leakage anddocument propagation in the network. For example, in one implementation,the known reference systems may include one or more computer systemsthat have been preconfigured to only include default operating systemfiles, valid patches, and other files that are installed (or should beinstalled) on all devices in the network, which may be compared to filesactually installed on other devices in the network to classify the otherdevices and track data leakage and document propagation in the network.

According to one aspect of the invention, in response to suitablycreating the tables or manifests to list the file hashes, file names,and paths that describe the directories or folders and associatedcontents on the known reference systems, one or more active scanners maythen collect information that describes file systems on the variousdevices in the network. For example, in one implementation, the activescanners may generally transmit packets or other messages to the variousdevices and subsequently receive response packets or other messagestherefrom to collect the information that describes the file systemsassociated therewith. More particularly, the active scanners may scanthe various devices in the network to collect file hashes, file names,and paths that describe every file located on the various devices inaddition to directory or folder locations associated therewith.Additionally, the active scanners may scan the devices in the network tocollect various attributes, metrics, or other properties associated withthe file systems discovered thereon. For example, in one implementation,the collected attributes, metrics, or other properties may includeowners, types, keywords, contents, and activities that certain usersperform to access, copy, modify, delete, move, or otherwise interactwith the files, directories, folders, or other file system contents.Moreover, in one implementation, the active scanners may scan thenetwork to collect external information relating to certain users,including hosts, servers, or other devices that the users frequentlyaccess, active directory logins associated with the users, or any otherinformation that may suitably describe activity that the users performin the network.

According to one aspect of the invention, in response to the activescanners suitably scanning the network to collect the file hashes, filenames, and paths that describe the file systems on the various deviceslocated therein and the associated attributes, metrics, properties, andthe external user information, the active scanners may return theinformation collected during the network scan to the management console.In one implementation, the management console may then build varioustables or manifests that list the file hashes, file names, and pathsassociated with the files that the active scanners discovered during thenetwork scan, which may be compared to the tables or manifests thatdescribe the file systems associated with the known reference systems.In particular, the tables or manifests associated with the ideal ormaster sets may be used to baseline the comparison and identify certainfiles discovered in the network that are unique to certain users,groups, departments, or other classifications. For example, in oneimplementation, the management console may run various matching andanalytical algorithms that perform additive and subtractive operationsto identify the files that are potentially unique to certainclassifications. In particular, the additive operations may identifyfiles that appear on a particular device that do not appear on a knownreference system compared thereto to identify files that are potentiallyunique to the user, group, department, or other classificationassociated therewith, and the subtractive operations may similarlyidentify files that appear on a known reference system that do notappear on a device compared thereto to detect potentially anomalousdeviations from the known reference system. Furthermore, various filtersmay be employed to reflect the practical reality that file systemsdiscovered on the scanned devices may include files that are notuniquely related to classifications relevant to managing the network.

According to one aspect of the invention, the various matching andanalytical algorithms that the management console may run to track dataleakage and document propagation in the network may identify file setgroups, user file set groups, file set activity rates, directory setactivity rates, file set deviations (from a baseline file set), filepropagations, and file set propagations, among other things, and furtherto monitor the network to detect movement or other activities associatedwith the files, users, and devices that may have significance from auditor security perspectives. For example, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may generate an audit trail that describes where anyparticular file was seen, who owned the file at what time, and whencertain files were copied, deleted, modified, exported or otherwiseaccessed to detect statistical anomalies or other deviations thatpotentially represent network breaches, unauthorized activities, filesystem drift, policy violations, or other vulnerabilities. Additionally,in one implementation, the management console may run the matching andanalytical algorithms using services associated with the active scannersand one or more passive scanners, which may observe or sniff variouspackets in traffic traversing the network to passively scan andreconstruct communication sessions that relate to activity occurring inthe network. For example, the passive scanners may apply varioussignatures to information in the observed or sniffed traffic to identifycertain files, users, devices, or other properties associated with thetraffic. Moreover, in one implementation, the management console mayinclude or communicate with a log data source that can receive,aggregate, or otherwise analyze events that the various devices in thenetwork generate to describe activity in the network.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may identify various properties, attributes, or othercharacteristics associated with the files discovered on the devices inthe network that do not appear on the known reference systems toidentify one or more file set groups (e.g., owning users, types,keywords, content, etc.). In particular, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may generate statistics that summarize certain files havingcommon or matching properties, which may be used to form files that havethe common or matching properties into the file set groups. In oneimplementation, one or more overlay rules may then be applied to furthermatch the owning users to the file set groups and subsequently monitoror otherwise control access to the file set groups. For example, inresponse to the active scanners, the passive scanners, or the log datasource detecting activity that relates to a user accessing or modifyinga particular file on a particular device, the overlay rules may beapplied to determine whether the activity represents a statisticalanomaly (e.g., based on file set groups that the user typically accessesand modifies). As such, in response to determining that the particularfile accessed or modified falls within a particular file set group thatincludes files that the user typically creates, alters, or otherwiseinteracts with, the management console may not generate an alert,whereas if the statistics indicate that the user has never (or rarely)created or interacted with files in that file set group, the alert maybe generated to trigger an investigation into the activity.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may further identify user file set groups using similartechniques used to identify the file set groups based on externalinformation relating to files that certain users own, active directorieslogins associated with the users, devices that the users have loggedinto or frequently access, or other information that suitably describesactivity that users normally or typically perform in the network. Assuch, the matching and analytical algorithms may match certain userswith certain file set groups, classifications, or statistics thatdescribe activities that the users normally or typically perform in thenetwork and create user file sets that correlate users to respectivefile sets, devices, organizational groups or departments, activities, orother classifications. In one implementation, activities that userssubsequently perform in the network may then be monitored to detectanomalies or other deviations from the statistics associated with theuser file sets. For example, a certain user may be added to members in aparticular user file set group if the external information associatedwith the user includes frequent logins to devices having a certainclassification and frequent edits to files classified in a related fileset group. Accordingly, if subsequent activity that the user performs inthe network matches criteria in a profile associated with the user fileset group to which the user was added, the management console would notgenerate an alert. However, if the subsequent activity relates to theuser accessing files or other data in a different user file set group,the management console may generate an alert to indicate that thesubsequent activity deviates from the statistics that describe normal orexpected activity associated with the user.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may further identify file set activity rates that includestatistics to describe normal or otherwise typical rates at whichcertain files in the network are changed, copied, moved, exported, orotherwise accessed. As such, in one implementation, activities orinformation that the active scanners, passive scanners, and log datasource subsequently observe in the network may be analyzed to detectpotential anomalies or deviations from the normal or typical file setactivity rates. In one implementation, the management console may thengenerate an alert if subsequent activities or information that theactive scanners, passive scanners, and log data source observe in thenetwork reveal modification or access activity that represents adeviation from the normal or typical statistics. In one implementation,the statistics that describe the normal or typical file set activityrates may be stored in a database, which may be referenced to analyzewhether activities performed on certain files or file sets deviate fromthe statistics that describe the normal or typical file set activityrates. Furthermore, the statistics that describe the normal or typicalfile set activity rates may be periodically compared to activities thatthe active scanners, passive scanners, and/or log data source observe inthe network to detect the potential anomalies or deviations from thenormal or typical file set activity rates and appropriately update thestatistics to reflect actual activity occurring in the network.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may similarly analyze the files in particular directories orfolders that have certain classifications to derive statistics thatrelate to normal or typical directory set activity rates. In particular,the normal or typical directory set activity rates may describe rates atwhich the directories or folders are visited or modified, normal ortypical activities that users perform when the directories or foldersare visited, users that frequently visit or modify the directories orfolders, per-directory or per-folder copy frequencies and percentages,per-directory or per-folder access frequencies and percentages, or anyother statistics that suitably describe normal or typical activity ratesassociated with certain directory sets. In one implementation, themanagement console may similarly store the statistics that describe thenormal or typical directory set activity rates in the database, whichmay be referenced to analyze whether activities subsequently performedon certain directories, folders, or contents associated therewithdeviate from normal. Furthermore, the statistics that describe thenormal or typical directory set activity rates may be periodicallycompared to activities observed in the network to detect the potentialanomalies or deviations from the normal or typical directory setactivity rates and appropriately update the directory set activity ratestatistics based on actual activity that occurs in the network.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may analyze the previously described file hashes, file names,and paths associated with the known reference systems to the filehashes, file names, and paths associated with the devices scanned in thenetwork to detect anomalous file set change events. In particular, thefile hashes, file names, and paths associated with the known referencesystems may provide the baseline file sets, which the matching andanalytical algorithms may compare to devices in the network that havethe same or substantially similar directories, folders, directory sets,or folder sets. As such, the management console may then summarize anydeviations between the baseline file sets and the same or substantiallysimilar file sets associated with the scanned devices to identifypotentially anomalous deviations between the file sets associated withthe scanned devices and the baseline file set. For example, if thebaseline file set associated with a known reference system includescertain files that are not present in the file sets associated withcertain scanned devices, or if the file sets associated with the scanneddevices include certain files that are not present in the baseline fileset associated with the known reference system, an alert may begenerated to indicate that the file systems associated with the scanneddevices may have been compromised.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may further track certain files or file sets to determinewhether certain files or file sets have been improperly propagatedacross the network (e.g., in a manner that deviates from policy, normalor typical activities, etc.). For example, in one implementation, themanagement console may identify certain files to track in response todetermining that hashes, checksums, or other signatures associatedtherewith appear on several devices in the network and generate an alertif multiple different users own the files having the same hashes,checksums, or other signatures (i.e., because different copiesassociated with the files on different devices may indicate that thefiles have been illicitly copied). In another example, the managementconsole may search file systems on devices with certain classificationsand generate an alert if the searched file systems include a high countassociated with files that have hashes, names, and paths matching filesthat were classified differently. Furthermore, in one implementation,the files or file sets may be identified and tracked individually,collectively, or selectively based on the particular interest associatedtherewith from auditing and/or security perspectives. For example, themanagement console may generate alerts in response to activity thatcopies tracked files or file sets off designated devices, transmits thetracked files or file sets across the network, or otherwise accesses thetracked files or file sets in a manner that deviates from policy, normalor typical activities, or other audit or security controls.

According to one aspect of the invention, the matching and analyticalalgorithms may further identify file and file set propagations using oneor more particular known data seeds. More particularly, the managementconsole may point the active scanners to a file server or other suitabledevice in the network and provide the active scanners with a wildcard orother suitable criteria to instruct the active scanners to collect allfiles from the file server or other suitable device that have satisfythe criteria. For example, in one implementation, the wildcard or othercriteria may specify a particular extension to provide the activescanners with a known data seed to identify files having a particulartype. As such, the active scanners may be pointed to the file server orother device to collect file hashes corresponding to any files thereonthat have satisfy the wildcard criteria provided from the managementconsole and then search other devices in the network to determinewhether file systems associated therewith have the same file hashes.Alternatively (or additionally), the active scanners may return the filehashes corresponding to the files that satisfy the wildcard criteria tothe management console, which may compare the returned file hashes tothe tables or manifests that list the file hashes associated with filesdiscovered on previously scanned devices. In either case, the managementconsole may generate an alert if the file hashes associated with thefiles that satisfy the wildcard criteria appear in anomalous locations.

Other objects and advantages of the invention will be apparent to thoseskilled in the art based on the following drawings and detaileddescription.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary system that may use file hashes to trackdata leakage and document propagation in a network, according to oneaspect of the invention.

FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary method that may use file hashes toclassify user systems and generate analytics to track data leakage anddocument propagation in a network, according to one aspect of theinvention.

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary method that may use file hashes, usersystem classifications, and related analytics to track data leakage anddocument propagation in a network, according to one aspect of theinvention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

According to one aspect of the invention, FIG. 1 illustrates anexemplary system that may use file hashes to track data leakage anddocument propagation in a network 100. In one implementation, the systemshown in FIG. 1 may generally include, among other things, a managementconsole 150 that may create one or more tables or manifests that listfile hashes, file names, and paths associated with every file on one ormore known reference systems, wherein the file hashes may includecryptographic hashes, checksums, or other unique signatures associatedwith the files on the known reference systems. For example, in oneimplementation, the management console 150 may perform a completecryptographic hash on every file on the known reference systems togenerate the file hashes associated therewith, or the management console150 may generate the hashes based on file sizes and cryptographic hasheson portions associated with the files on the known reference systems(e.g., performing the cryptographic hashes on a beginning block, anending block, and one or more selected blocks within the files). In oneimplementation, the management console 150 may alternatively generatethe file hashes using any suitable technique that can generateinformation to uniquely identify the files on the known referencesystems based on contents, attributes, or other properties associatedwith the files on the known reference systems. In one implementation,the tables or manifests that list the file hashes, file names, and pathsassociated with the files on the known reference systems may thereforedescribe one or more directories or folders and contents associatedtherewith, which may provide “ideal” or master sets that can be used tobaseline subsequent comparisons performed with various matching andanalytical algorithms to track data leakage and document propagation inthe network 100. For example, in one implementation, the known referencesystems may include one or more computer systems that have beenpreconfigured to only include default operating system files, validpatches, and other files that are installed (or should be installed) onall devices 130 in the network 100 (e.g., a Windows 7 computer thatinformation technology personnel preconfigured to only include defaultWindows 7 operating system files, valid Windows 7 patches, or otherfiles associated with a default installation applicable to every device130 in the network 100).

In one implementation, in response to suitably creating the tables ormanifests to list the file hashes, file names, and paths that describethe directories or folders and associated contents on the knownreference systems, one or more active scanners 110 may then collectinformation that describes file systems on the various devices 130 inthe network 100. For example, in one implementation, the active scanners110 may generally transmit packets or other messages to the variousdevices 130 and subsequently receive response packets or other messagesfrom the various devices 130 to scan the devices 130 and collect theinformation that describes the file systems associated therewith. Moreparticularly, in one implementation, the active scanners 110 may scanthe various devices 130 in the network 100 to collect file hashes, filenames, and paths that describe every file located thereon and directoryor folder locations associated with the files located thereon. In oneimplementation, the file hashes that describe every file located on thevarious devices 130 may be generated in a substantially similar to theknown reference systems (e.g., based on complete cryptographic hashes,partial cryptographic hashes combined with file sizes, or any othersuitable technique that can generate information to uniquely identifythe files on the various devices 130). Additionally, the active scanners110 may further scan the various devices 130, which may generallyinclude various user computers, servers, hosts, or other suitabledevices 130, to collect various attributes, metrics, or other propertiesassociated with the file systems discovered on the various devices 130.For example, in one implementation, the various collected attributes,metrics, or other properties may include, among other things, owners,types, keywords, contents, and activity (e.g., actions that certainusers perform to access, copy, modify, delete, move, or otherwiseinteract with the files, directories, folders, or other contentsassociated with the file systems). Moreover, in one implementation, theactive scanners 110 may further scan the network 100 to collect externalinformation relating to certain users, which may include hosts, servers,or other devices 130 that certain users frequently access, activedirectory logins, or any other information that may suitably describeactivity that certain users perform in the network 100.

In one implementation, once the active scanners 110 have suitablyscanned the network 100 to collect the file hashes, file names, andpaths that describe the file systems on the various devices 130 in thenetwork 100, the various attributes, metrics, and other propertiesassociated therewith, and the external information relating to usersassociated with the network 100, the active scanners 110 may return theinformation collected during the network scan to the management console150. As such, in one implementation, the management console 150 may thenbuild various tables or manifests that list the file hashes, file names,and paths associated with the files that the active scanners 110discovered on the various devices 130 during the network scan, which themanagement console 150 may compare to the tables or manifests thatdescribe the file systems associated with the known reference systems.In particular, the management console 150 may compare the ideal ormaster sets represented via the tables or manifests associated with theknown reference systems to baseline the comparison and identify certainfiles discovered on the various devices 130 that are unique to certainusers, groups, departments, or other classifications in the network 100.For example, in one implementation, the management console 150 maycompare the table or manifest associated with a particular knownreference system to the file hashes, file names, and associated paths onsimilar devices 130 in a particular department to identify files thatmay potentially be uniquely related to that department (i.e., comparingthe table or manifest associated with a Windows 7 reference computer tothe file hashes, file names, and associated paths on similar Windows 7computers in human resources, marketing, accounting, development, andother departments may reveal files that are potentially unique to thehuman resources, marketing, accounting, development, and otherdepartments).

Accordingly, in one implementation, the management console 150 maygenerally run various matching and analytical algorithms that performadditive and subtractive operations to compare the tables or manifestsassociated with the known reference systems to the tables or manifestsassociated with similar devices 130 scanned in the network 100 toidentify various files that are potentially unique to certain users,groups, departments, or other classifications in the network 100. Forexample, in one implementation, the additive operations may identifycertain files that appear on a particular device 130 that do not appearon a known reference system compared thereto, which may represent filesthat are potentially unique to the owning user, group, department, orother classification associated with the device 130. Similarly, thesubtractive operations may identify certain files that appear on aparticular known reference system that do not appear on a particulardevice 130 compared thereto, which may be used to detect potentiallyanomalous deviations from the ideal or master set that the knownreference system represents (e.g., certain files on the known referencesystem not being present on the device 130 compared thereto may reflectthat the operating system installation associated with the device 130was compromised, that a web server mirror device 130 no longer matchesthe master web server represented via the known reference system, etc.).Furthermore, in one implementation, the management console 150 mayemploy various filters in the additive and subtractive operations toreflect the practical reality that the file systems discovered on thescanned devices 130 may include certain files that are not uniquelyrelated to users, groups, departments, or other classifications in thenetwork 100. In particular, the various devices 130 in the network 100may include personal email files, file caches from browsing the Internet160, and human resource documents that are sent to every employee oruser in the network 100, among other files that are not necessarilyrelevant to classifications in the network 100. As such, in oneimplementation, the matching and analytical algorithms that themanagement console 150 runs may be configured to perform the additiveand subtractive operations to identify various devices 130 in thenetwork 100 that have file systems with similar differences relative tothe file systems associated with the known reference systems (e.g.,files that do not appear on the known reference systems but have highappearance counts and identical hashes, names, and paths on multipledifferent devices 130).

In one implementation, the following description provides additionaldetail relating to the matching and analytical algorithms that themanagement console 150 may run to track data leakage and documentpropagation in the network 100. More particularly, the matching andanalytical algorithms may be used to identify file set groups, user fileset groups, file set activity rates, directory set activity rates, fileset deviations (from a baseline file set), file propagations, and fileset propagations, among other things, wherein the matching andanalytical algorithms may be run in various combinations andpermutations, whether or not explicitly described. Moreover, in oneimplementation, the various matching and analytical algorithms may beused to track or otherwise monitor movement or other propagationassociated with the files, users, devices 130, and other networkinformation classified therewith and determine whether the monitoredmovement or propagation has significance from an audit or securityperspective. For example, from the audit perspective, the managementconsole 150 may use the various matching and analytical algorithms togenerate a trail that describes where any particular file was seen(e.g., devices 130 where a hash associated with the file was observed ordiscovered), a user or users who owned the file and times when the useror users owned the file, whether and/or when the file was copied,deleted, modified, exported or otherwise accessed. Further, from thesecurity perspective, the management console 150 may use the variousmatching and analytical algorithms to detect statistical anomalies orother deviations based on whether the monitored movement or propagationpotentially represents a network breach, unauthorized activity, filesystem drift, policy violations, or other vulnerabilities in the network100.

Additionally, as will be described in further detail below, themanagement console 150 may run the matching and analytical algorithmsusing services associated with the active scanners 110 in addition toone or more passive scanners 120, which may generally observe or sniffvarious packets in traffic traversing the network 100 to passively scanand reconstruct communication sessions that relate to activity occurringin the network 100. For example, in one implementation, the passivescanners 120 may apply various signatures to information in the observedor sniffed traffic to identify certain files, users, devices 130, orother properties associated with the traffic. Furthermore, to observe orsniff the traffic traversing the network 100, the passive scanners 120may be deployed on or behind one or more hubs 140, spanned switch ports140, taps 140, choke points 140, routers 140, or other suitablelocations in the network 100 that enable the passive scanners 120 toobserve network traffic. Moreover, in one implementation, the managementconsole 150 may include (or be in communication with) a log data source(not shown), which may include a correlation engine, a log aggregator,or other suitable data source that can receive, aggregate, or otherwiseanalyze events from the various devices 130 distributed across thenetwork 100. For example, in one implementation, the log data source mayreceive, aggregate, or otherwise analyze events that internal orexternal firewalls 140, routers 140, servers 130, devices 130, operatingsystems or applications running thereon, or any other suitable sourcemay generate to describe operating system activities, file modificationactivities, device insertion activities, intrusion attempts, or othernetwork activity.

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms used toidentify file set groups may identify various properties, attributes, orother characteristics associated with the files discovered on thedevices 130 in the network 100 that do not appear on the known referencesystems, wherein the identified properties, attributes, or othercharacteristics associated with the discovered files may include owningusers, types, keywords, content, or other criteria. As such, in oneimplementation, the management console 150 may use the matching andanalytical algorithms to generate statistics that summarize certainfiles having common or matching properties, attributes, or othercharacteristics, wherein the management console 150 may use thegenerated statistics to form the files that have common or matchingproperties, attributes, or other characteristics into one or more fileset groups (e.g., financial statements). In one implementation, themanagement console 150 may further apply one or more overlay rules tomatch the owning users to the file set groups and subsequently monitoror otherwise control access thereto. For example, in one implementation,in response to the active scanners 110, the passive scanners 120, or thelog data source detecting activity that relates to a particular useraccessing or modifying a particular file on a particular device 130 inthe network 100, the management console 150 may apply the overlay rulesto determine whether the activity represents a statistical anomaly(e.g., based on file set groups that the user typically accesses andmodifies). As such, in response to determining that the particular fileaccessed or modified falls within the “financial statements” file setgroup, the management console 150 may not trigger an investigation orotherwise generate an alert if the previously generated statisticsindicate that the user typically creates, alters, or otherwise interactswith “financial statement” files (whether or not the user initiallycreated the particular file). However, if the statistics indicate thatthe user has never (or rarely) created or interacted with “financialstatement” files, the management console 150 may generate the alert andtrigger the investigation in response to the user performing activity toaccess or modify “financial statement” files. Moreover, in response tothe activity modifying, altering, or otherwise changing the file, thecomponent that observed the activity (e.g., the active scanners 110,passive scanners 120, or log data source) may generate a checksum orother hash value associated with the changed file, which may be sent tothe management console 150 to update the tables or manifests thatdescribe the file systems associated with the changed file andappropriately update the previously generated tracking analyticsassociated therewith.

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms used toidentify user file set groups may extend the techniques that thematching and analytical algorithms use to identify the file set groupsto further identify various user file sets based on external informationrelating to files that certain users own (e.g., files that the userscreated, have authorization to access, etc.), active directories,servers, hosts, or other devices 130 in the network 100 that certainusers have logged into or frequently access, or other information thatsuitably describes activity that certain users perform in the network100. As such, in one implementation, the management console 150 may usethe various matching and analytical algorithms to match certain userswith certain file set groups, classify the users into different groups,generate statistics that describe activities that the users frequentlyperform in the network 100, or otherwise correlate users with file sets,devices 130, organizational groups or departments, activities, or otherclassifications in the network 100. More particularly, in oneimplementation, the management console 150 may receive the externalinformation used to derive the user file sets from the active scanners110, the passive scanners, and/or the log data source and then run thematching and analytical algorithms to create user file set statisticsthat correlate users to respective file sets, devices 130,organizational groups or departments, activities, or otherclassifications. In one implementation, the management console 150 maythen monitor activities that users subsequently perform in the network100 to detect anomalies or other deviations from the user file setstatistics (e.g., based on information or activity that the activescanners 110, passive scanners, and log data source observe in thenetwork 100). For example, in one implementation, the matching andanalytical algorithms may add a certain user to members in a “ChiefFinancial Officer's Office” user file set group if the externalinformation associated with the user includes frequent logins toservers, hosts, or other devices 130 having an “accounting department”classification and frequent edits to files classified in the “financialstatements” file set group. Accordingly, if the management console 150matches subsequent activity that the user performs in the network 100 tocriteria in a profile associated with the “Chief Financial Officer'sOffice” user file set group, the management console 150 would notgenerate an alert. However, if the subsequent activity relates to theuser accessing files or other data in a different user file set group(e.g., “Engineering Source Code”), the management console 150 maygenerate an alert to indicate that the subsequent activity deviates fromthe statistics that describe normal or expected activity associated withthe user.

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms used toidentify file set activity rates may generate statistics that describenormal or otherwise typical rates at which certain files in the network100 are changed, copied, moved, exported, or otherwise accessed. Assuch, in one implementation, the management console 150 may analyzeactivities or information that the active scanners 110, passive scanners120, and log data source subsequently observe in the network 100 todetect potential anomalies or deviations from the normal or typical fileset activity rates. For example, in one implementation, the statisticsthat describe the normal or typical file set activity rates may indicatethat individual files in the “financial statements” file set group arechanged or modified once per month on average, that the total files inthe “financial statements” file set group are rarely moved from onelocation to another, and that the total files in the “financialstatements” file set group are rarely or infrequently edited. As such,the management console 150 may then generate an alert in response tosubsequent activities or information that the active scanners 110,passive scanners 120, and log data source observe in the network 100revealing modification or access activity that represents a suddenincrease or other deviation from the normal or typical statistics (e.g.,daily modifications to an individual file, activity that moves or copiesall the files in the “financial statements” file set group to anotherlocation, etc.). In one implementation, the management console 150 maystore the statistics that describe the normal or typical file setactivity rates in a database, which the management console 150 mayreference to analyze whether activities performed on certain files orfile sets deviate from the statistics that describe the normal ortypical file set activity rates. Further, in one implementation, themanagement console 150 may periodically compare the statistics thatdescribe the normal or typical file set activity rates to activitiesthat the active scanners 110, passive scanners 120, and/or log datasource observe in the network 100 to detect the potential anomalies ordeviations from the normal or typical file set activity rates and updatethe file set activity rate statistics to reflect actual activityoccurring in the network 100 at a particular time.

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms maysimilarly analyze the files in particular directories or folders thathave certain classifications to derive statistics that relate to normalor typical directory set activity rates. In particular, the normal ortypical directory set activity rates may describe rates at which thedirectories or folders are visited or modified, normal or typicalactivities that users perform when the directories or folders arevisited, users that frequently visit or modify the directories orfolders, per-directory or per-folder copy frequencies and percentages,per-directory or per-folder access frequencies and percentages, or anyother statistics that suitably describe normal or typical activity ratesassociated with certain directory sets. For example, the statistics mayindicate that the directory “\\mjr\product-docs” has a low visitationrate, the user “mjr” represents the only user that normally visits thedirectory, and that user “mjr” typically views only one file whenvisiting the directory. As such, the management console 150 may generatean alert if a user that has never visited the directory before (e.g., auser other than “mjr”) suddenly does so, if the user other than “mjr”copies, edits, or modifies the directory or files contained therein, ifthe user “mjr” copies, edits, or modifies the directory or contentsassociated therewith in a manner that deviates from the normal ortypical rates, or if any other activities performed in connection withthe directory or the contents associated therewith are anomalous orotherwise deviate from the normal or typical statistics. In oneimplementation, the management console 150 may further store thestatistics that describe the normal or typical directory set activityrates in the database and reference the statistics to analyze whetheractivities performed on certain directories, folders, or contentsassociated therewith deviate from normal (e.g., based on a ratio betweenthe total files in a particular directory or folder and how many filesin the directory or folder were copied, edited, or modified).Furthermore, the management console 150 may similarly compare thestatistics that describe the normal or typical directory set activityrates to activities observed in the network 100 to periodically detectthe potential anomalies or deviations from the normal or typicaldirectory set activity rates and update the directory set activity ratestatistics to reflect actual activity that occurs in the network 100.

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms used toidentify file set deviations relative to the baseline file set mayanalyze the previously described file hashes, file names, and pathsassociated with certain known reference systems to file hashes, filenames, and paths associated with certain devices 130 scanned in thenetwork 100 to detect anomalous file set change events. In particular,the file hashes, file names, and paths associated with certain knownreference systems may provide the baseline file sets, which maygenerally include one or more directories, folders, directory sets,folder sets, and various files contained therein. In one implementation,the matching and analytical algorithms may then identify certain devices130 scanned in the network 100 that have the same or substantiallysimilar directories, folders, directory sets, or folder sets, whereinthe files contained in the directories, folders, directory sets, orfolder sets associated with the scanned devices 130 may be compared tothe same or substantially similar baseline file sets. As such, themanagement console 150 may then summarize any deviations between thebaseline file sets and the same or substantially similar file setsassociated with the scanned devices 130 (e.g., statistically, indetailed lists, etc.). Accordingly, in one implementation, themanagement console 150 may analyze the deviations between the baselinefile sets and the same or substantially similar file sets associatedwith the scanned devices 130 to identify potentially anomalousdeviations between the file sets associated with the scanned devices 130and the baseline file set. For example, if the baseline file setassociated with a known reference system that represents a defaultoperating system installation includes certain files that are notpresent in the file sets associated with certain scanned devices 130,the deviation may indicate that a required patch needs to be installedon the scanned devices 130, that users associated with the scanneddevices 130 have tampered with the operating system installation, orthat the operating system installation associated with the scanneddevices 130 has otherwise been compromised. In another example, thebaseline file set may be associated with a master web server that storesvarious files that should be similarly stored on every web server mirror130 associated therewith, whereby the management console 150 maydetermine that one or more web server mirrors 130 no longer match themaster web server if any files appearing in the baseline file set do notappear in the file set associated with the one or more web servermirrors 130, or alternatively if any files appearing in the file setassociated with the one or more web server mirrors 130 do not appear inthe baseline file set (i.e., because the master web server and the webserver mirrors 130 should be identical to one another).

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms used toidentify file and file set propagations may track certain files or filesets to determine whether the files or file sets have potentiallypropagated across the network 100 in a manner that deviates from policy,from normal or typical activities, or other ways that may be significantfrom audit or security perspectives. For example, in one implementation,the management console 150 may identify a certain file to track inresponse to determining that the hash, checksum, or other signatureassociated therewith appears on several devices 130 in the network 100,wherein one or more alerts may be generated if multiple different usersown the file having the hash, checksum, or other signature associatedtherewith (i.e., because different users owning different copiesassociated with the file on different devices 130 may indicate that thefile has been illicitly copied or otherwise propagated in the network100). In another example, the management console 150 may search filesystems on certain devices 130 classified into DNS server or developmentgroups and generate an alert if the searched file systems include a highcount associated with files that have hashes, names, and paths matchingfiles that were classified in an accounting group (e.g., due to beinguniquely associated with devices 130 classified in the accounting groupbased on previous comparisons to the known reference systems). Further,in one implementation, a certain file or file set may be identified andtracked individually, collectively, or selectively based on the file orfile set having significant interest (e.g., because the file or file setincludes sensitive data, intellectual property, or otherwise hasparticular relevance that merits tracking the file or file set fromaudit or security perspectives). As such, the management console 150 maythen generate an alert in response to activity that copies the trackedfile or file set off a designated device 130, transmits the tracked fileor file set across the network 100, or otherwise accesses the trackedfile or file set in a manner that deviates from policy, normal ortypical activities, or other audit or security controls.

In one implementation, the matching and analytical algorithms mayfurther identify file and file set propagations using one or moreparticular known data seeds. More particularly, the management console150 may point the one or more active scanners 110 to a file server orother suitable device 130 in the network 100 and provide the activescanners 110 with a wildcard or other suitable criteria relating to theknown data seeds, wherein the wildcard or other criteria relating to theknown data seeds may instruct the active scanners 110 to collect allfiles from the file server or other suitable device 130 that have aparticular extension and then search other devices 130 in the network100 to identify files that have the same extension. For example, in oneimplementation, the wildcard or other suitable criteria may specify a“.c” extension to provide the active scanners 110 with a known data seedthat can be used to identify files containing source code written in theC programming language. As such, in one implementation, the activescanners 110 may be pointed to the file server or other device 130 tocollect file hashes corresponding to any files thereon that have aparticular extension or satisfy other wildcard criteria provided fromthe management console 150 and then search any other device (or devices)130 in the network 100 to determine whether file systems associatedtherewith have the same file hashes. Alternatively (or additionally),the active scanners 110 may return the file hashes corresponding to thefiles that have the particular extension or satisfy the other wildcardcriteria to the management console 150, which may compare the filehashes returned from the active scanners 110 to the tables or manifeststhat list the file hashes associated with files discovered on thedevices 130 that were previously scanned. In either case, the managementconsole 150 may generate an alert in response to determining that thefile hashes associated with the files that satisfy the wildcard criteriaappear in anomalous locations (e.g., if the wildcard specifies the “.c”extension to identify C source code files, devices 130 classified into adevelopment group may be expected to have files with matching filehashes, whereas high counts on non-user workstations or non-engineeringworkstations would not be expected and therefore cause an alert to begenerated).

In one implementation, further detail relating to the features andfunctionality associated with the system shown in FIG. 1 and describedabove may be provided in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/863,238,entitled “System and Method for Managing Network Vulnerability AnalysisSystems,” which issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,926,113 on Apr. 12, 2011, U.S.patent application Ser. No. 11/016,761, entitled “System and Method forScanning a Network,” which issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,761,918 on Jul. 20,2010, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/313,710, entitled “System andMethod for Managing Events,” filed Dec. 22, 2005, U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 12/693,803, entitled “System and Method forCorrelating Network Identities and Addresses,” filed Jan. 26, 2010, U.S.patent application Ser. No. 12/695,659, entitled “System and Method forEnabling Remote Registry Service Security Audits,” filed Jan. 28, 2010,U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/729,036, entitled “System and Methodfor Passively Identifying Encrypted and Interactive Network Sessions,”filed Mar. 22, 2010, and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/775,120,entitled “System and Method for Three-Dimensional Visualization ofVulnerability and Asset Data,” filed May 6, 2010, the contents of whichare hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

According to one aspect of the invention, FIG. 2 illustrates anexemplary method 200 that may use file hashes to classify user systemsand generate analytics to track data leakage and document propagation ina network. In particular, the method 200 illustrated in FIG. 2 mayinclude a management console configuring one or more known referencesystems in an operation 210, which may further include the managementconsole creating one or more tables or manifests that list file hashes,file names, and paths associated with every file on the referencesystems. For example, in one implementation, the management console mayperform a complete cryptographic hash on every file on the knownreference systems to generate the file hashes associated therewith orthe hashes may be generated based on file sizes and cryptographic hasheson portions associated with the files or any other technique that cansuitably generate information to uniquely identify the files on theknown reference systems. In one implementation, the tables or manifeststhat list the file hashes, file names, and paths associated with thefiles on the known reference systems configured in operation 210 maytherefore describe one or more directories or folders and associatedcontents that provide “ideal” or master sets that can be used tobaseline subsequent comparisons that various matching and analyticalalgorithms may perform to track data leakage and document propagation inthe network. For example, in one implementation, the known referencesystems configured in operation 210 may include one or more computersystems that have been preconfigured to only include default operatingsystem files, valid patches, and other files that are installed orshould be installed on all devices in the network (e.g., a Windows 7computer that information technology personnel preconfigured to onlyinclude default Windows 7 operating system files, valid Windows 7patches, or other files associated with a default installationapplicable to every device in the network).

In one implementation, in response to suitably creating the tables ormanifests to list the file hashes, file names, and paths that describethe directories or folders and associated contents on the knownreference systems, an operation 220 may include one or more activescanners collecting information that describes file systems on variousdevices in the network. For example, operation 220 may include theactive scanners transmitting packets or other messages to the variousdevices in the network and subsequently receiving response packets orother messages that provide information that describes the file systemsassociated therewith. As such, in one implementation, the activescanners may scan the various devices in operation 220 to collect filehashes, file names, and paths that describe every file located thereonand directory or folder locations associated with the files locatedthereon, wherein the file hashes associated with the files on thescanned devices may be generated in a substantially similar to the knownreference systems. Additionally, the active scanners may further scanthe various devices in operation 220 to collect various attributes,metrics, or other properties associated with the file systems discoveredon the various devices (e.g., owners, types, keywords, contents, andactivities associated with the file systems) and external informationrelating to certain users (e.g., hosts or servers that certain usersfrequently access, active directory logins associated with certainusers, etc.).

In one implementation, in response to the active scanners havingsuitably scanned the network, operation 220 may further include theactive scanners returning the information collected during the networkscan to the management console, which may then build various tables ormanifests that list the file hashes, file names, and paths associatedwith the files that the active scanners discovered in the network scan.In one implementation, the management console may then compare theinformation returned from the active scanners to the tables or manifeststhat describe the file systems associated with the known referencesystems to build file system tracking tables associated with the variousscanned devices. In particular, operation 220 may include the managementconsole comparing the ideal or master sets represented via the tables ormanifests associated with the configured known reference systems tobaseline the comparison and identify certain files discovered on thevarious devices that are unique to certain users, groups, departments,or other classifications in the network. For example, in oneimplementation, the table or manifest associated with a particular knownreference system may be compared to the file hashes, file names, andassociated paths on similar devices in a particular department toidentify files that may potentially be uniquely related to thatdepartment (i.e., comparing the table or manifest associated with aWindows 7 reference computer to the file hashes, file names, andassociated paths on similar Windows 7 computers in various departmentsmay reveal files that are potentially unique to those departments).

As such, in one implementation, the management console may then runvarious matching and tracking algorithms in an operation 230 to classifythe file systems associated with the scanned devices and generatetracking analytics to subsequently detect potential data leakage anddocument propagation in the network. For example, in one implementation,the matching and analytical algorithms may perform various additive andsubtractive operations in operation 230 to compare the tables ormanifests associated with the known reference systems to the tables ormanifests associated with similar devices scanned in the network toidentify various files that are potentially unique to certain users,groups, departments, or other classifications in the network. Inparticular, the additive operations may identify certain files thatappear on a particular device that do not appear on a known referencesystem compared thereto, which may represent files that are potentiallyunique to the owning user, group, department, or other classificationassociated with the device. Similarly, the subtractive operations mayidentify certain files that appear on a particular known referencesystem that do not appear on a particular device compared thereto, whichmay be used to detect potentially anomalous deviations from the ideal ormaster set that the known reference system represents. In oneimplementation, operation 230 may further employ various filters in theadditive and subtractive operations to reflect the practical realitythat the file systems discovered on the scanned devices may includecertain files that are not uniquely related to users, groups,departments, or other classifications in the network (e.g., personalemail files, Internet browsing caches, and other files that are notnecessarily relevant to classifying the user file systems or generatingthe tracking analytics).

In one implementation, as will be described in further detail below inconnection with FIG. 3, an operation 240 may then include the managementconsole running the matching and analytical algorithms in a trackingcontext to detect activity that relates to potential data leakage anddocument propagation in the network. More particularly, operation 240may run the matching and analytical algorithms in various combinationsand permutations to identify various file set groups, user file setgroups, file set activity rates, directory set activity rates, file setdeviations from a baseline file set, file propagations, and file setpropagations to track or otherwise monitor movement or other propagationassociated with the files and the users, devices, and other networkclassifications associated therewith. In one implementation, anoperation 250 may then include the management console determiningwhether the monitored movement or propagation has significance from anaudit or security perspective. For example, in response to determiningthat certain movement or propagation events have significance from anaudit or security perspective, the management console may use thevarious matching and analytical algorithms in an operation 260 toanalyze the movement or propagation events (e.g., to generate a trailthat describes where files associated with the events were seen, moved,accessed, or otherwise interacted with, users who owned the filesassociated with the events and times when the user or users owned thefiles, whether and/or when the files were copied, deleted, modified,exported or accessed, etc.). Further, from the security perspective, themanagement console may use the various matching and analyticalalgorithms to detect statistical anomalies or other deviations based onwhether the monitored movement or propagation potentially represents anetwork breach, unauthorized activity, file system drift, policyviolations, or other vulnerabilities in the network, in which caseoperation 260 may include the management console 260 triggering aninvestigation into the activity that represents potential data leakageor document propagation. Further, in one implementation, the method 300may return to operation 230 to appropriately update any previouslycreated classifications and tracking analytics based on relevantmovement or propagation events detected in operation 250, and moreover,the method 300 may continue to run the tracking algorithms in operations240 to monitor activity in the network and detect additional events thatrelate to potential data leakage or document propagation.

According to one aspect of the invention, FIG. 3 illustrates anexemplary method 300 that may use file hashes, user systemclassifications, and related analytics to track data leakage anddocument propagation in a network. In particular, the method 300illustrated in FIG. 3 may generally be performed periodically (e.g., atscheduled intervals), in response to certain conditions (e.g., asecurity or compliance audit), or at any other suitable time to evaluatepotential data leakage or document propagation in the network.

In one implementation, the method 300 shown in FIG. 3 may includeexecuting one or more matching or analytical algorithms in an operation310, wherein the matching or analytical algorithms executed in operation310 may compare one or more user file systems discovered on devicesassociated with the network to one or more reference file systemsassociated with one or more known reference systems, which have beendescribed in further detail above. For example, in one implementation,the matching or analytical algorithms executed in operation 310 mayidentify deviations in the user file systems relative to a baseline fileset, which may include analyzing the previously described file hashes,file names, and paths associated with the known reference systems tofile hashes, file names, and paths associated with the devices scannedin the network to detect anomalous file set change events. Inparticular, the file hashes, file names, and paths associated with theknown reference systems may describe one or more directories, folders,directory sets, folder sets, and various files associated with thebaseline file sets. In one implementation, the matching or analyticalalgorithms executed in operation 310 may then identify certain devicesscanned in the network that have the same or substantially similardirectories, folders, directory sets, or folder sets to the baselinefile sets and compare the files in the directories, folders, directorysets, or folder sets associated with the scanned devices to the same orsubstantially similar baseline file sets. As such, an operation 320 maythen include a management console determining whether any deviationsexist between the baseline file sets and the same or substantiallysimilar file sets associated with the scanned devices, wherein themanagement console may trigger alert in an operation 370 to investigateany potential deviations that were detected in operation 320.

In particular, operation 320 may include the management consoleanalyzing any deviations that may have been detected between thebaseline file sets and the same or substantially similar file setsassociated with the scanned devices to determine whether the detecteddeviations are potentially anomalous, represent potential data leakage,or otherwise have auditing or security significance. For example, if thebaseline file set associated with a known reference system thatrepresents a default operating system installation includes certainfiles that are not present in the file sets associated with certainscanned devices (i.e., the user file systems), operation 370 may includethe management console triggering an alert to investigate whether thedeviation indicates that a required patch needs to be installed on thescanned devices, that users associated with the scanned devices havetampered with the operating system installation, or that the operatingsystem installation associated with the scanned devices has otherwisebeen compromised. In another example, the baseline file set may beassociated with a master web server that stores various files thatshould be similarly stored on every web server mirror associatedtherewith, whereby the alert triggered in operation 370 may be analyzedto investigate whether one or more web server mirrors no longer matchthe master web server if any files appearing in the baseline file set donot appear in the file set associated with the one or more web servermirrors or vice versa (i.e., because the master web server and the webserver mirrors should be identical to one another). Furthermore,operation 370 may include the management console summarizing thedetected deviations statistically, in detailed lists, or in any otherway to suitably enable the investigation into the deviations between theuser file systems and the known reference file systems.

In one implementation, the matching or analytical algorithms may befurther executed in an operation 330 to track sensitive files andgenerate movement trails associated therewith. For example, in oneimplementation, operation 330 may include the management consolepointing one or more active scanners to a file server or other suitabledevice in the network and providing the active scanners with one or morewildcards, criteria, or other suitable data seeds (e.g., a particularfile extension). As such, the active scanners may use the data seedsprovided from the management console in operation 330 to identify allfiles on the file server or other device that the management consolepointed to that satisfy the criteria associated with the data seed andthen search other devices in the network to identify files that furthersatisfy the criteria associated with the data seed. For example, in oneimplementation, the data seed may include a wildcard or other suitablecriteria that specifies a “.c” extension, which may cause the activescanners to identify any files on the file server or other suitabledevice that contain source code written in the C programming language.As such, operation 330 may include the active scanners collecting filehashes corresponding to any identified files that satisfy the criteriaassociated with the data seed and then searching file systems associatedwith other devices in the network to detect any files that have the samefile hashes. Alternatively (or additionally), the active scanners mayreturn the file hashes corresponding to the files that satisfy thecriteria associated with the data seed to the management console, whichmay then compare the file hashes returned from the active scanners totables or manifests that list the file hashes associated with filesdiscovered on devices in the network that were previously scanned. Ineither case, an operation 340 may include the management consoledetermining whether any matches between the file hashes associated withthe files identified on the file server or other device and the filehashes associated with the files on the user file systems representpotentially improper propagation in the network. As such, in oneimplementation, the management console may generate an alert inoperation 370 in response to operation 330 resulting in a determinationthat the file hashes associated with the files that satisfy the criteriaassociated with the data seeds appear in anomalous location. Forexample, if the data seeds specify the “.c” extension to identify Csource code files, devices classified into a development group may beexpected to have files with matching file hashes, whereby operation 340would not generate an alert or otherwise trigger an investigation if theonly devices with matching file hashes are classified into thedevelopment group. However, non-user workstations or non-engineeringworkstations would not be expected to have matching file hashes, wherebyan alert may be generated to trigger an investigation in operation 370if non-user or non-engineering workstations include files that havehashes matching the hashes associated with the files having the “.c”extension.

In one implementation, the matching or analytical algorithms executed inoperation 330 may further track certain files or file sets that may besensitive or otherwise important from auditing or security perspectivesto determine whether the files or file sets have potentially propagatedacross the network in a manner that deviates from policy, normal ortypical activities, or in other ways significant to auditing or securitycontrols. For example, in one implementation, operation 330 may includetracking certain files that have hashes, checksums, or other signaturesappearing on several devices in the network, in which case operation 340may then determine whether multiple different owners are associated withthe files that have the same hashes, checksums, or other signatures onthe different devices. As such, operation 370 may then generate an alertto trigger an investigation into potential propagation if multipledifferent users own the files having the same hashes, checksums, orother signatures because different users owning different copies thereofon different devices may indicate that the file has been illicitlycopied or otherwise propagated in the network. In another example,operations 330 and 340 may include searching file systems on certaindevices having certain classifications, which may result in operation370 generating an alert if the searched file systems include a highcount associated with files that have hashes, names, and paths matchingfiles that have different classifications. Further, in oneimplementation, certain files or file sets may be identified and trackedindividually, collectively, or selectively based on the specificauditing, security, or other interest associated with the files or filesets, wherein operation 370 may generate an alert if activity copies thetracked files or file sets off designated devices, transmits the trackedfiles or file sets across the network, or otherwise accesses the trackedfiles or file sets in a manner that deviates from policy, normalactivities, or other controls.

In one implementation, the matching or analytical algorithms may befurther executed in an operation 350 to track file system access andchange events. For example, in one implementation, operation 350 mayinclude the matching or analytical algorithms identifying variousproperties, attributes, or other characteristics associated with thefiles discovered on the devices scanned in the network that do notappear on the known reference systems (e.g., owning users, types,keywords, content, etc.). As such, in one implementation, the matchingor analytical algorithms may then generate statistics that summarizecertain files having common or matching characteristics in operation350, wherein the management console may use the generated statistics toform the files that have the common or matching characteristics into oneor more file set groups (e.g., financial statements). In oneimplementation, the management console may further apply one or moreoverlay rules in operation 350 to match the owning users to the file setgroups, which may be used to subsequently monitor or otherwise controlaccess thereto in an operation 360. For example, in one implementation,in response to the active scanners, one or more passive scanners, or alog data source detecting activity that relates to a particular useraccessing or modifying a particular file on a particular device in thenetwork, the overlay rules may be applied in operation 360 to determinewhether the activity represents a statistical anomaly (e.g., based onfile set groups that the user typically accesses and modifies). As such,in response to determining that the particular file accessed or modifiedfalls within the “financial statements” file set group and thepreviously generated statistics indicate that the user typicallycreates, alters, or otherwise interacts with “financial statement”files, operation 360 would not generate an alert or otherwise trigger aninvestigation. However, if the statistics indicate that the user hasnever (or rarely) created or interacted with “financial statement” filesand the activity relates to the user accessing or modifying “financialstatement” files, operation 370 may generate the alert to trigger theinvestigation. Moreover, in response to the activity modifying,altering, or otherwise changing the file, a checksum or other hash valueassociated with the changed file may be generated and used in operation350 to update the file system access and change statistics associatedtherewith.

Additionally, in one implementation, operation 350 may further extendthe techniques used to identify the file set groups to further identifyvarious user file sets based on external information relating to certainusers (e.g., files that the users created, files that the users haveauthorization to access, active directories, servers, hosts, or otherdevices that the users have logged into or frequently access, etc.). Assuch, in one implementation, operation 350 may further include thematching or analytical algorithms matching certain users with certainfile set groups, classifying the users into different groups, generatingstatistics that describe activities that the users frequently perform inthe network, or otherwise correlating users with file sets, devices,groups, departments, activities, or other network classifications. Moreparticularly, the management console may use the external information inoperation 350 to derive user file set statistics that correlate certainusers to respective file sets, devices, groups, departments, activities,or other classifications, and operation 360 may include the managementconsole monitoring activities that users subsequently perform in thenetwork to detect anomalies or other deviations from the user file setstatistics. For example, operation 350 may include the matching oranalytical algorithms adding a certain user to members in a particulargroup (e.g., “Chief Financial Officer's Office”) if the externalinformation associated with the user includes frequent logins toservers, hosts, or other devices classified in that group (e.g., an“accounting department”) and frequent edits to files similarlyclassified (e.g., “financial statements” files). Accordingly, ifoperation 360 results in the management console matching subsequentactivity that the user performs in the network to criteria in a profileassociated with the user file set group in which the user hasmembership, operation 370 would not generate an alert or otherwisetrigger an investigation. However, if the subsequent activity relates tothe user accessing files or other data in a different user file setgroup (e.g., “Engineering Source Code”), operation 370 may generate analert to trigger an investigation into the subsequent activity thatdeviated from the statistics that describe the normal or expected useractivity.

Furthermore, in one implementation, operation 350 may identify variousfile set activity rates to generate statistics that describe normal ortypical rates at which certain files in the network are changed, copied,moved, exported, accessed or otherwise used. In this context, operation360 may include analyzing activities or information observed in thenetwork to detect potential anomalies or deviations from the normal ortypical file set activity rates. For example, the statistics thatdescribe the normal or typical file set activity rates may indicate thatindividual files in the “financial statements” file set group arechanged or modified once per month on average, that the total files inthe “financial statements” file set group are rarely moved from onelocation to another, and that the total files in the “financialstatements” file set group are rarely or infrequently edited. As such,operation 370 may then generate an alert in response to subsequentactivities in the network modifying or accessing certain files or filesets in a manner that represents a sudden increase or other deviationfrom the normal or typical statistics (e.g., daily modifications to anindividual file, moving or copying all the files in the “financialstatements” file set group to another location, etc.). Furthermore, inone implementation, the statistics that describe the normal or typicalfile set activity rates may be periodically compared to activitiesobserved in the network to appropriately update the file set activityrate statistics to reflect actual activity occurring in the network.

In one implementation, operation 350 may similarly include the matchingor analytical algorithms analyzing the files in particular directoriesor folders that have certain classifications to derive statistics thatrelate to normal or typical directory set activity rates. In particular,the normal or typical directory set activity rates may describe rates atwhich the directories or folders are visited or modified, normal ortypical activities that users perform when the directories or foldersare visited, users that frequently visit or modify the directories orfolders, per-directory or per-folder copy frequencies and percentages,per-directory or per-folder access frequencies and percentages, or anyother statistics that suitably describe normal or typical activity ratesassociated with certain directory sets. For example, the statistics mayinclude visitation rates associated with certain directories, users thatnormally visit or otherwise access the directories, and activities thatthe users typically perform visiting the directories. As such, themanagement console may generate an alert to trigger an investigation inoperation 370 if a user that has never previously visited a certaindirectory does so, if any user (including those that normally visit oraccess the directory) copies, edits, or modifies the directory orcontents associated therewith in a manner that deviates from the normalor typical rates, or if any other activities performed in connectionwith the directory or the contents associated therewith are anomalous orotherwise deviate from the normal or typical statistics. Further, in oneimplementation, the statistics that describe the normal or typicaldirectory set activity rates may similarly compared to activitiesobserved in the network to periodically and appropriately update thedirectory set activity rate statistics to reflect actual activityoccurring in the network.

Implementations of the invention may be made in hardware, firmware,software, or any suitable combination thereof. The invention may also beimplemented as instructions stored on a machine-readable medium that canbe read and executed on one or more processing devices. For example, themachine-readable medium may include various mechanisms that can storeand transmit information that can be read on the processing devices orother machines (e.g., read only memory, random access memory, magneticdisk storage media, optical storage media, flash memory devices, or anyother storage or non-transitory media that can suitably store andtransmit machine-readable information). Furthermore, although firmware,software, routines, or instructions may be described in the abovedisclosure with respect to certain exemplary aspects and implementationsperforming certain actions or operations, it will be apparent that suchdescriptions are merely for the sake of convenience and that suchactions or operations in fact result from processing devices, computingdevices, processors, controllers, or other hardware executing thefirmware, software, routines, or instructions. Moreover, to the extentthat the above disclosure describes executing or performing certainoperations or actions in a particular order or sequence, suchdescriptions are exemplary only and such operations or actions may beperformed or executed in any suitable order or sequence.

Furthermore, aspects and implementations may be described in the abovedisclosure as including particular features, structures, orcharacteristics, but it will be apparent that every aspect orimplementation may or may not necessarily include the particularfeatures, structures, or characteristics. Further, where particularfeatures, structures, or characteristics have been described inconnection with a specific aspect or implementation, it will beunderstood that such features, structures, or characteristics may beincluded with other aspects or implementations, whether or notexplicitly described. Thus, various changes and modifications may bemade to the preceding disclosure without departing from the scope orspirit of the invention, and the specification and drawings shouldtherefore be regarded as exemplary only, with the scope of the inventiondetermined solely by the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system for facilitating data leakage and/orpropagation tracking on a network, comprising: a computer system one ormore processors programmed to execute computer program instructionsthat, when executed, cause the computer system to: obtain a set ofhashes that are associated with files of a user system, and a referenceset of hashes that are associated with files of a reference system;determine an additional subset of hashes included in the set of hashesand not included in the reference set of hashes based on a comparisonbetween the set of hashes and the reference set of hashes; predict thata file is exclusive for one or more users or exclusive for one or moreuser systems, the file being associated with a hash included in theadditional subset of hashes; scan one or more other user systems todetermine what files are on the other user systems, wherein each of theother user systems is assigned to one or more other users or is not oneof the user systems; and generate an alert indicating unauthorizedactivity, wherein the alert is generated responsive to the scanindicating that the other user systems contain the file predicted to beexclusive for the users or exclusive for the user systems.
 2. The systemof claim 1, wherein the computer system is caused to: obtain a set ofnames or paths that are associated with the files of the user system;obtain a reference set of names or paths associated with the files ofthe reference system; and determine an additional subset of names orpaths included in the set of names or paths and not included in thereference set of names or paths based on a comparison between the set ofnames or paths and the reference set of names or paths, whereinpredicting the file as being exclusive for the users or exclusive forthe user systems is further based on the additional subset of names orpaths.
 3. The system of claim 1, wherein the computer system is causedto: obtain a set of names and paths that are associated with the filesof the user system; obtain a reference set of names and paths associatedwith the files of the reference system; and determine an additionalsubset of names and paths included in the set of names and paths and notincluded in the reference set of names and paths based on a comparisonbetween the set of names and paths and the reference set of names andpaths, wherein predicting the file as being exclusive for the users orexclusive for the user systems is further based on the additional subsetof names and paths.
 4. The system of claim 1, wherein the computersystem is caused to: observe traffic associated with the network todetect activity that changed, copied, moved, or accessed one or morefiles on user systems of the network; and generate, based on thedetected activity, an audit trail associated with the files that werechanged, copied, moved, or accessed, wherein the audit trail includesinformation to describe (i) one or more of the user systems at which thedetected activity was observed, (ii) at least one user that owned thefiles associated with the detected activity, (iii) times when the usersowned the files associated with the detected activity, and (iv) thedetected activity.
 5. The system of claim 1, wherein the computer systemis caused to: obtain, based on the scan, hashes associated with filesthat are on the other user systems; and generate the alert responsive toa determination that at least one of the hashes obtained based on thescan matches the hash associated with the file predicted to be exclusivefor the users or exclusive for the user systems.
 6. The system of claim1, wherein the computer system is caused to: generate the alertresponsive to a determination that one or more files of user systems ofthe network have different owners on more than one of the user systems.7. The system of claim 1, wherein the computer system is caused to:identify one or more files or file sets having auditing or securitysignificance, wherein one or more of user systems of the network aredesignated to store the files or file sets having the auditing orsecurity significance; and generate the alert responsive to adetermination that the files or file sets have been copied or moved offof the designated user systems.
 8. The system of claim 1, wherein thecomputer system is caused to: generate statistics that describe normalactivities that at least one user perform to interact with at least somefiles of the user systems; and generate the alert responsive to adetermination that interactions with the at least some files of the usersystems deviate from the statistics describing the normal activitiesthat the users perform to interact with the at least some files of theuser systems.
 9. The system of claim 1, wherein the computer system iscaused to: generate statistics that describe normal activities that atleast one user perform to interact with one or more directories orfolders that contain at least some files of the user systems; andgenerate the alert responsive to a determination that interactions withthe directories or folders deviate from the statistics describing thenormal activities that the users perform to interact with thedirectories or folders.
 10. The system of claim 1, wherein the set ofhashes associated with the files of the user system comprises one ormore of checksums, complete cryptographic hashes, or partialcryptographic hashes.
 11. A method for facilitating data leakage and/orpropagation tracking on a network, the method being implemented on acomputer system that includes one or more processors executing computerprogram instructions that, when executed, perform the method, the methodcomprising: obtaining a set of hashes that are associated with files ofa user system, and a reference set of hashes that are associated withfiles of a reference system; determining an additional subset of hashesincluded in the set of hashes and not included in the reference set ofhashes based on a comparison between the set of hashes and the referenceset of hashes; predicting that a file is exclusive for one or more usersor exclusive for one or more user systems, the file being associatedwith a hash included in the additional subset of hashes; scanning one ormore other user systems to determine what files are on the other usersystems, wherein each of the other user systems is assigned to one ormore other users or is not one of the user systems; and generating analert indicating unauthorized activity, wherein the alert is generatedresponsive to the scan indicating that the other user systems containthe file predicted to be exclusive for the users or exclusive for theuser systems.
 12. The method of claim 11, further comprising: obtaininga set of names or paths that are associated with the files of the usersystem; obtaining a reference set of names or paths associated with thefiles of the reference system; and determining an additional subset ofnames or paths included in the set of names or paths and not included inthe reference set of names or paths based on a comparison between theset of names or paths and the reference set of names or paths; whereinpredicting the file as being exclusive for the users or exclusive forthe user systems is further based on the additional subset of names orpaths.
 13. The method of claim 11, further comprising: obtaining a setof names and paths that are associated with the files of the usersystem; obtaining a reference set of names and paths associated with thefiles of the reference system; and determining an additional subset ofnames and paths included in the set of names and paths and not includedin the reference set of names and paths based on a comparison betweenthe set of names and paths and the reference set of names and paths,wherein predicting the file as being exclusive for the users orexclusive for the user systems is further based on the additional subsetof names and paths.
 14. The method of claim 11, further comprising:observing traffic associated with the network to detect activity thatchanged, copied, moved, or accessed one or more files on user systems ofthe network; and generating, based on the detected activity, an audittrail associated with the files that were changed, copied, moved, oraccessed, wherein the audit trail includes information to describe (i)one or more of the user systems at which the detected activity wasobserved, (ii) at least one user that owned the files associated withthe detected activity, (iii) times when the users owned the filesassociated with the detected activity, and (iv) the detected activity.15. The method of claim 11, further comprising: obtaining, based on thescan, hashes associated with files that are on the other user systems;and generating the alert responsive to a determination that at least oneof the hashes obtained based on the scan matches the hash associatedwith the file predicted to be exclusive for the users or exclusive forthe user systems.
 16. The method of claim 11, further comprising:generating the alert responsive to a determination that one or morefiles of user systems on the network have different owners on more thanone of the user systems.
 17. The method of claim 11, further comprising:identifying one or more files or file sets having auditing or securitysignificance, wherein one or more user systems of the network aredesignated to store the files or file sets having the auditing orsecurity significance; and generating the alert responsive to adetermination that the files or file sets have been copied or moved offof the designated user systems.
 18. The method of claim 11, wherein thesets of hashes associated with the files of the user systems comprisesone or more of checksums, complete cryptographic hashes, or partialcryptographic hashes.
 19. A non-transitory, computer-readable mediastoring machine-readable instructions that, when executed, by a dataprocessing apparatus cause the data processing apparatus to performoperations comprising: obtaining a set of hashes that are associatedwith files of a user system, and a reference set of hashes that areassociated with files of a reference system; determining an additionalsubset of hashes included in the set of hashes and not included in thereference set of hashes based on a comparison between the set of hashesand the reference set of hashes; predicting that a file is exclusive forone or more users or exclusive for one or more user systems, the filebeing associated with a hash included in the additional subset ofhashes; scanning one or more other user systems to determine what filesare on the other user systems, wherein each of the other user systems isassigned to one or more other users or is not one of the user systems;and generating an alert indicating unauthorized activity, wherein thealert is generated responsive to the scan indicating that the other usersystems contain the file predicted to be exclusive for the users orexclusive for the user systems.
 20. The computer-readable media of claim19, wherein the operations comprise: obtaining, based on the scan,hashes associated with files that are on the other user systems; andgenerating the alert responsive to a determination that at least one ofthe hashes obtained based on the scan matches the hash associated withthe file predicted to be exclusive for the users or exclusive for theuser systems.